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Abstract
The Auction

We present business-to-business electronic auction
mechanism as an alternative to sales usually
accomplished through negotiation. The mechanism
allows bids that are incompletely specified yet provide an
evaluative framework to facilitate the allocation of
complementary goods when substitutes are available. The
auction form allows the consumer to create a unique
combination of goods upon which to place a multiple
criteria bid. Bidders are given the flexibility to change
and or modify their bids and bundles until a stopping
criterion has been reached. The allocation to bidders
requires solving a complex combinatorial problem in realtime. Since the proposed integer program model may
become computationally intractable as the number of
bidders increase, we present simplifying heuristics to
make the problem manageable on a large scale.
(Combinatorial Auction, Integer Programming, Constraint
Programming, Multi-criteria Auction, Greedy Algorithm,
Advertising)

A combinatorial auction is a particular multi-item
auction type that allows package bidding. This type of
auction has been shown to be effective when
complementarities exist among the items being sold and
or in complex environments such as those involving
overlapping demand for the various products to be
bundled (Banks, Ledyard & Porter, 1989; Demartini,
Kwasnica, Ledyard & Porter, 1999). Our Incompletely
Specified Combinatorial Auction (ISCA) builds upon the
advantages of the combinatorial auction by incorporating
characteristics inherent in negotiated sales. Negotiated
environments are often characterized by the presence of
multiple evaluation criteria and loosely defined demand
specifications, properties not supported by current auction
mechanisms. The ISCA allows the buyer to submit a bid
amount together with a variety of constraints on the
collective allocation. The bid itself is inexact in that it
may not specifically identify the individual items desired
but provides a framework that the mechanism uses to
identify appropriate units to satisfy the buyer's needs
based on some evaluative measure(s).

Introduction
This research presents a new business-to-business
electronic auction mechanism designed to replace a
traditional negotiated environment for a bundle of
complimentary goods. Auctions provide an effective,
alternative means of price discovery, especially for
products hard to price a priori or when information
asymmetries are present. (Englbrecht-Wiggans, 1980;
Milgrom, 1989; Choi & Whinston, 1998). However,
incorporating the negotiation process into an auction
mechanism requires the bid to contain extended
specifications. The complexities generated by the
required modifications to existing auctions have
discouraged widespread use of electronic negotiation
models (Choi, Stahl & Whinston, 1997). Our mechanism
and satisficing heuristics effectively incorporate these
enigmatic characteristics.

The Model
Specifically, we model the purchase of television
airtime for annual advertising campaigns. Termed "upfront" by the industry, these negotiations take place once
a year to sell television ads spanning an entire broadcast
year. Contractually, there is no after-market for the
products involved. A campaign can be viewed as a
collection or bundle of 15-second units from various
shows. Media buyers desire a specific amount of
demographic reach, or number of people with target
characteristics exposed to their commercial. There are a
variety of demographic categories upon which a show is
rated and the number of people viewing determines the
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frame specified. The problem is simply too large for
CPLEX to obtain an answer in real time. 783 units
distributed over 109 pods or "commercial breaks" in 24
shows make up a typical week of airtime. Approximately
100 to 200 buyers compete for these units. This translates
to approximately 150,000 binary variables and 900,000
constraints.
We are currently exploring the use of Constraint
Programming (CP) as a potential real time solution
methodology. Constraint programming finds variable
instantiations that simultaneously satisfy all specified
constraints while optimizing a stated objective
(Macworth, 1992). Although, constraint programming is
our overarching methodology we incorporate a number of
other techniques such as traditional relaxation,
decomposition, aggregation, branch and bound, and
dynamic and linear programming into our heuristic.
Defining the television commercial time allocation
problem as a constraint programming problem involves
specifying the variables, domains and constraints as well
as determining the order of variable instantiation and
value assignment. Our constraints are well defined in the
integer program and do not require modification.
However, the implementation of these constraints can be
accomplished more directly, often with simple
programming logic. Domains are not enumerated as is
usually the case in constraint programming. Rather, we
decompose the problem formulation into sub-problems
involving various constraints. The sub-problems
represent implicit domains.
We are currently experimenting with variable and
value ordering. Our initial investigation gives preference
to bidders with the highest bid per thousand demographic
exposures (BPM). This approach was chosen to ensure
that the buyers with the highest valuation for the units
desired will have the largest domain from which to create
their bundle. Normal branch-and-bound search is used to
handle complicating constraints such as protection from
competitive advertising in the same pod.
Preliminary evidence suggests that constraint
programming will facilitate expeditious and efficient
allocations upon which to base our auction mechanism.
Once the ultimate model has been established we will
evaluate its performance through simulation.
Experiments will involve using automated agents to
simulate bidder types discovered from actual data and
varying the demand characteristics of the market.
Additionally, we will study our solution methodology by
comparing its results with the solutions obtained by a
commercial integer programming package on
representative problems that are sufficiently small for it to
reach a solution to the combinatorial optimization. We
will also evaluate our heuristic's performance in terms of
running time and allocative efficiency.

reach or gross impressions for that category. Each show
includes a number of substitute units that are equally
capable of satisfying show demand and a variety of show
combinations that will meet or exceed the buyer's
demographic requirement.
In our auction, buyers specify demographic gross
impression requirements, a selection of desired and
forbidden shows, the campaign commercial length (15seconds, 30, 45, 60 or mixed), product type and an overall
bid amount. Also included in the bid is an upper and
lower bound indicating the bidder's willingness to deviate
from her collection of program choices and the maximal
number of ads allowed per show. The inexact nature of
the bid suggests that bidder specification of desired shows
may not on its own entirely satisfy the demographic
demand requirement. Additional units needed to achieve
the desired demographics will be selected by the auction
mechanism so as to maximize seller revenue. Industry
specific constraints include requirements to separate
competing advertisements, referred to as "pod protection,"
retain inventory to be sold throughout the remainder of
the season for shorter term campaigns, and regulate the
number of commercials appearing in each commercial
break. Our mechanism takes the bid information and
determines an allocation that ensures ad placement to
achieve all the constraints imposed by the bid, constraints
unique to the environment and competitive demand
among participants for a finite supply of goods.
The ISCA is conducted in rounds with soft closing
rules that act as an inducement to ensure participation in
all rounds. Bidders may change their bids until a stopping
criterion has been reached. To reduce churning, bid
modifications will be limited to a defined incremental
dollar increase, loosening bidder imposed constraints or
both.
A generalization of our model can be adapted to any
environment where multiple complementary goods are
desired when substitutes are available and the allocation
of goods is based on constraints imposed by both the
buyer and seller.

Solution Methodology:
The prime challenge is to develop a solution
methodology that is tractable, scales to the sizes needed
and reaches a solution in real time. Combinatorial
auctions are NP-Complete and as such a heuristic must be
developed to obtain a satisficing solution in real time
(Rothkopf, Pekec & Harstad, 1998). At the start of each
round of bidding our auction mechanism will be supplied
with the new bid information from which to determine an
allocation. The rounds are at most 12 hours apart and
thus the algorithm's performance is critical to the
successful implementation of the auction mechanism as
the computational time is the limiting factor.
We model our auction as an integer program.
Attempts to solve the IP using the latest solver software,
CPLEX have been unsuccessful – at least within the time-
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Summary
References

Our Incompletely Specified Combinatorial Auction
incorporates the characteristics needed to act as a viable
alternative to negotiation. Due to the complexity of the
multi-item, multi-criteria combinatorial allocation
problem we are investigating heuristic methodologies to
achieve a satisficing solution in real time. Our
experiments will test the performance and efficiency of
our auction mechanism through simulation.
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